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Abstract. Our experiment is made by three treatments. The first one reproduces 
the classical public good game. The second environment represents a perfect 
competition market where the contribution of a representative player to the 
private good gives a positive rent if and only if it is not lower than the highest 
contribution of the other players in the group. In the third treatment we consider a 
winner-take-all market where we have only a winner per group. The aim is to test 
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Experimental evidence shows that people usually cooperate more than would be expected in terms 
of the maximization of purely selfish utility functions. This conclusion is sustained by a lot of 
experiments in Ultimatum games (introduced by Guth et al., 1982), gift-exchange games (Fehr et 
al., 1993), Trust games (Berg et al., 1995) and Third-Party Punishment games (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2004). We observe cooperation also in public goods games (Ledyard, 1995, for a 
survey) and its level increases if punishment of defectors is available (Fehr and Gachter, 2000 and 
2002). The idea that fairness and/or altruistic concerns may be present in “normal” preferences 
(Fehr and Scmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) produces a significant shift in mainstream 
economics. 
According to Fehr and Schmidt (2000), traditional economics admit selfishness as the normal 
determinant of human behavior because it generalizes the typical behavior in perfectly competitive 
market environments to the whole set of human choices.
1 
However, as we know that not all economic environments correspond to perfectly competitive 
markets, we may expect a zero level of cooperation if the environment is perfectly competitive but a 
positive level if it is not. To test this hypothesis is one of the aims of our paper. Moreover, we want 
to analyse whether the level of cooperation is higher in an environment where cooperation is 
induced by fairness or in a secenario where it is stimulated by the market structure.  
Our experiment is made by three treatments. The first one (baseline) reproduces the classical public 
good game where the payoff generated by the private good for each player is not influenced by the 
behaviour of the others. The second environment represents a perfect competition market. In this 
version of the public good game the contribution of a representative player to the private good gives 
a positive rent if and only if it is not lower than the highest contribution of the other players in the 
group. In the third treatment we consider a winner-takes-all market where we have only a winner 
per group as in a all-pay-auction (i.e. a call for tender for the building of a bridge or in an election 
with a majority rule, Levin and Nalebuff, 1995). In this kind of market the comments about the cost 
of fairness are the same as in perfect competition, but agents face additional problems concerning 
risk and beliefs about the behaviour of the others. These features may lead to cooperation. 
 
                                                 
1 A perfectly competitive market needs selfefish behavior. In fact, a non-maximizing agent loses her/his “normal” profit 
in equilibrium and s/he is expelled from the market. In other words, a cooperative non-maximizing subject does not 
reduce her/his potential gain, but s/he faces a loss - potentially a total loss. And we know both from the experimental 
and from prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Knetsch and Sinden, 1987) that subjects are much more 
averse to losses than to missed gains. In a previous experiment (Canegallo et al., 2007), we show that a perfectly 
competitive market leads subjects to selfish behavior also in laboratory. 
 
  2The Nash equilibrium for a selfish player in the no–competition environment and in the perfect 
competition market is straightforward. S/He always chooses not to cooperate. This is not true for 
the winner-takes-all environment. In this case the Nash equilibrium for each player depends on the 
level of his/her risk aversion and on the behavior of other players. 
In the second section we show in details the experimental design. In the third we describe the 
experimental model and the Nash equilibria. In the fourth we present the data analysis and in the 
last section some conclusions are outlined. 
 
2. Experimental design 
The experiment took place in the Laboratory of Experimental Economics of the University of 
Milano Bicocca.
2 Each of the three treatments was run with 32 undergraduate students – every 
student participated in only one treatment – who were allocated in groups of 4 and played the game 
for ten periods. During the course of a treatment the composition of the groups remained the same. 
This means that we adopted a partner protocol. Each agent’s payoff corresponded to the sum of 
his/her earnings over the ten rounds. Before the beginning of the game, participants were asked to 
answer some control questions to be sure that all the subjects understood the rules of the game and 
the way payments were computed. We respected the requirements of anonymity – players’ 
identities were unknown even when the treatment ended. 
Overall, 96 students participated to the experiment. Each treatment lasted about two hours and the 
average payoff was € 16.7. 
 
The Baseline Treatment (BT) 
In each period subjects were endowed with 125 eurocents to spend in two different projects (A and 
B). In Project A each player received the sum invested multiplied by 1.2. Project B was a public 
good that yielded the same payoff to all participants, no matter their contribution were. In each 
group, the public fund to be equally distributed among participants was obtained by multiplying by 
1.8 all the contributions. 
 
The Competition Treatment (CT) 
Also in this case, in each period subjects were endowed with 125 eurocents to distribute between 
Project A and Project B. Subjects who invested money in Project A participated to a competition 
where the winner(s) was(were) the player(s) who put the highest sum in the project. The winner(s) 
                                                 
2 The program was written by the programmer of the AL.EX Laboratory (University of Eastern Piedmont), dr. Marie – 
Edith Bissey, by using Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999). 
  3got all the money collected in the project, increased by 20%, while the losers lost all the money 
invested in the project. Project B was the same as in the BT. 
 
The Winner – Take – All  Treatment (WTT) 
Again, in each period subjects were endowed with 125 eurocents to distribute between Project A 
and Project B. As in the CT, to win the competition in Project A – and obtain all the money 
collected in the project, increased by the 20% - it  was necessary to invest the highest sum in the 
project. However, in this case, if more than one player invested the highest sum, the winner would 
be randomly chosen. All the other players lost the money invested in the project. Project B was the 
same as in the BT. 
 
3.The experimental model 
We analyse the payoffs of each player per round in each treatment. 
In our model: 
-  Wi: player i’s pay-off in each round 
-  xi: eurocent invested in project A by player i 
-  gi,j eurocent invested in project B by player i,j 
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  4where w is the number of winners 
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if player i is a looser. 
The payoffs are s.t the constraint expressed in equation (1). 
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if player i is a looser 
The payoffs are s.t the constraint expressed in equation (1). 
 
3.1 The Nash Equilibria 
The Nash equilibrium in BT and CT is always the allocation xi = 125 and gi = 0. In the WTT 
something changes. The Nash equilibrium depends on the level of risk. If all the players are risk-
lover or risk-neutral, we have the same allocation as in BT and CT and the Nash equilibrium does 
not change. If this is not the case, there is something different. 
Each player’s choice about contribution depends on her level of risk aversion as well as on the other 
three players’ risk aversion. Obviously, each player knows only her own level of risk aversion and 
has beliefs on risk aversion of the others. 
In equation (2) we describe the maximization problem of the utility function of our representative 
player.  
 
  5() ( ) j i i i r r f W U , max =           ( 2 )  
 
where: 
ri: level of risk aversion of player i (known by player i) 
rj: level of risk aversion of player j = 1, 2, 3 (unknown by player i) 
 
This is the scenario in the first round. In this case the we have multiple equilibria and the choice 
about the level of contribution to the public good , for a risk averse player, is quite a random choice. 
However, if we assume the presence of a risk neutral/risk lover player in each group or that the 
probability that at least one player allocates her whole endowment into the private good, the Nash 
equilibria are two: either to contribute to the public good or to the private one. In our treatment we 
observe that, from round 3 to round 10, 63 out 64 times there is at least one player per group that 
contributes 0 to g. Consequently, it seems reasonable to assume that players consider that the 
probability that, at least, one player per-group plays x = 125 and g = 0 in each period is equal to 1. 
Then the problem of utility maximization for player i becomes: 
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)
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where: 
p: probability that at least one player plays x = 125 and g = 0. 
As argued before, if we assume that p = 1, the utility function maximization problem in equation (3) 
becomes: 
 
() ( 1 , max i i i r f W U =             ( 4 )  
 
Following equation (4), we have two Nash equilibria that we may analyse on the basis of the level 
of risk aversion of the players in each group. 
Let us consider a simple example. We assume the presence of a risk-averse player and three risk-
neutral players. We need to measure the level of risk aversion of our player. We consider one of the 
most used measure of expected utility: the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility 
function.  
We consider ten periods. At the beginning of each period, our risk-averse player decides his 
strategy on the basis of the value associated to his utility function. He has two rational choices: xi = 
125 and gi = 0 or xi = 0 and gi = 125. 
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if she decides for the strategy xi = 125 and gi = 0. 
He compares the value of his utility in equation (5) and in equation (6) and he chooses his strategy. 
In particular, he chooses xi = 125 and gi = 0 if the value of r is lower than 0,415. 
At the same time, if our player knows that two players (one player) are risk neutral and the other 
one is (two are) strongly risk averse (for example, r = 3), he chooses xi = 125 and gi = 0 if the value 
of r is lower than 1,05 (2,25). Otherwise he chooses xi = 0 and gi = 125. 
The scenario where all the players put the whole endowment in the public good is not a Nash 
equilibrium. In fact, in this case the level of risk aversion should be +∞ for each player (in fact, it 
never occurs in our treatment). 
Table 1 shows the behaviour of player i according to her level of risk aversion in a certain scenario 




When n* is …  i contributes to the public good if r is greater than … 
0  0,41 
1  1,05 
2  2,25 
3  + ∞ 
* n: number of contributors to the public good 
 
To sum up, in the WTT we expect that risk-lover, risk-neutral and low-risk-averse (r < 0.41) play a 
pure strategy – to invest their whole endowment into the private good. On the other hand, if a 
player’s r is higher that 0.41, we expect he will play mixed strategies – sometimes he will invest 
everything into the private good and some others into the public good. 
 
  74. Expected results 
Hypothesis 1. Some players in the BT devote money to the public good. 
The theoretical model assumes that subjects are self interested and, consequently, they won’t 
contribute to the public good. However, the experimental literature provides the evidence that some 
players are ready to finance the public good at the beginning and to decline their contribution over 
time. We expect that in the BT some players are self interested and decide not to contribute, while 
some others are cooperative and devote money to the public good.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Competition decreases cooperation. 
According to some experimental results obtained in a previous work (Canegallo et al., 
forthcoming), we expect that competition decreases contributions. In particular, we expect that 
contributions in the CT are lower than in the BT.  
 
Hypothesis 3. A winner – take – all  scenario may enhance cooperation. 
 We do not have any experimental evidence concerning the effect of the winner-take-all market in a 
prisoner’s dilemma scenario. According to the theoretical model, the situation changes. Subjects’ 
relative contributions to the public good depend on their risk-aversion level. 
 
5. Results  
In our analysis we will consider two different datasets. The former will contain all the observations 
from round 1 to 6, while the latter will contain the observations from round 1 to 10 for all the 
groups but 2. This is due to the fact that in the BT we lost observations of two groups from round 7 
to 10.  
 
1) Descriptive statistics 
We start by describing the evolution of the average contributions over the ten rounds in all the 
treatments (Figure 1, Table 2). In the BT the average contribution at round 1 is 41.58% of the 
endowment, while at round 10 declines to 3.7%. In the CT the average contribution at round 1 is 
30.9% of the endowment, while at round 10 falls to 6.2%. Finally, in the WTT the average 
contribution at round 1 is 40.9% of the endowment, while at round 10 is still at 37%.  
If we consider only the first six rounds, the situation is almost the same – in the WTT, the average 
contribution remains at high levels. In particular, at round 6 it is 18.3% in the BT, 13.4% in the CT 
and 52.9% in the WTT. 
  8If we run a Spearman correlation test to check the trend of the average contributions over time, it 
turns out that they significantly decline both in the BT and in the CT (ρ = -0.943 and ρ = -0.829, p = 
0.0048 and p = 0.0416,  when we consider only the first six rounds; ρ = -0.988 and ρ = -0.77,  p < 
0.0001 and p = 0.0092 when we consider all the 10 rounds). On the other hand, contributions in the 
WTT seem not to be sensible to time (ρ = 0.2,  p = 0.704 when we consider only the first six 
rounds;  ρ = 0.248,  p = 0.489 when we consider all the 10 rounds). The implication is that 
contributions follow a declining pattern only in the BT and in the CT.  
A Kruskal –Wallis test with the group means as observations rejects the null hypothesis that there 
are no differences among the treatments both when we analyse the first six rounds (χ
2(2) = 7.215,  p 
= 0.027) and when we consider all the 10 rounds  (χ
2(2) = 9.682,  p = 0.0079). If we analyse this 
differences in details (Mann-Whitney tests), we find out that, at the beginning contributions are 
significantly lower in the CT, but over time contributions in the BT and in the CT show a similar 
pattern while they are  significantly higher in the WTT (Table 3). 
 
Figure 1  










































Table 2 – Average individual contributions 
 Rounds 
 1  10 1-10 
BT  51.9 4.6 26.53 
CT  38.6 7.8 20.56 
WTT  51.1 46.25 43.52 
 
 
  9Table 3 – Mann-Whitney test 
 Round 
 1  5  10 
BT vs CT 
Z = 1.86 
(p = 0.06) 
Z = 1.16 
(p = 0.25) 
Z = 0.45 
(p = 0.65) 
BT vs WTT 
Z = 0.49 
(p = 0.63) 
Z = -1.68 
(p = 0.09) 
Z = -2.43 
(p = 0.01) 
CT vs WTT 
Z = -1.42 
(p = 0.15) 
Z = -1.79 
(p = 0.07) 
Z = -2.65 
(p = 0.008) 
 
 
2) The random-effects Tobit model 
Our observations are double censored – they are bounded between 0 (lower level) and 125 (upper 
level). Consequently, our dependent variable  (C*i,t) is represented by each subject’s desired 






































This means that our latent variable is equal to the observed contribution when it lays between 0 and 
125. 
 
We estimate our model as a random-effects Tobit
3 censored at 0 and 125. In specification 1 (S1) 
 
t i i t i t i winner d n competitio d neg pos C period C , 2 1 2 1 1 , 2 1
*
, ε µ λ λ β β α + + + + ∆ + ∆ + + + = −  
(S1) 
while in specification 2 (S2) and in specification 3 (S3) we introduce some interaction terms 
t i i
t i t i
period winner period n competitio
winner d n competitio d neg pos C period C
, 2 1
2 1 2 1 1 , 2 1
*
,
* * ε µ ϖ ϖ
λ λ β β α
+ + + +




                                                 
3 For completeness we estimate the model also with OLS (cluster option) and a Tobit regression. t i i
t i t i
winner pos winner neg period winner period n competitio
winner d n competitio d neg pos C period C
, 4 3 2 1
2 1 2 1 1 , 2 1
*
,
* * * * ε µ ϖ ϖ ϖ ϖ
λ λ β β α
+ + ∆ + ∆ + + +




-  period  represents the round played by subjects. We check the effect of the time on the 
contribution level because we know from previous works that an end effect exists and is 
crowed out only by punishment; 
-   is the contribution to the public good of each player in the previous period. This 
variable allows to understand whether people are sticky on their decisions as it turned out, for 
example, in Chaunduri et al. (2006); 
1 , − t i C
































t j t i C C  are the 
distances of player i’s contribution from the average contribution of the group. They detect 
the influence of the group’s behavior on each player’s contribution. In particular, they check 
whether players are conditional cooperators and they level their contributions; 
-  competition and winner are dummy variables equal to 1 if the observation belongs to that 
specific treatment;  
-  competition*period  (CT*t)  and winner*period (WTT*t)  are interaction terms to find out 
whether time effect is different according to the treatment;  
-  ∆pos*winner (∆pos*WTT) and ∆neg*winner (∆neg*WTT) are interaction terms to find out 
whether group’s behavior has a different impact on players’ decisions in the WTT; 
- µi is the subject – specific error component. 
 
Result 1. Competition deters cooperation while a winner-take-all scenario enhances it.  
Both from Figure 1 and Table 4, it emerges that contributions decrease over time both in the BT and 
in the CT, while the opposite happens in the WTT. Moreover, in specification 1 (Table 4), 
contributions are significantly lower in the CT than in the BT, while they are significantly higher in 
the WTT. A chi-square test rejects the null hypothesis that contributions in the CT are equal to 
contributions in the WTT. According to specification 2 (Table 4), there is no significant difference 
between the BT and the CT, while contributions in the WTT are still significantly higher. The 
existence of a negative impact of competition on cooperation is confirmed by Canegallo et al. 
(2007). This result is not surprising. Since Adam Smith it is clear that competition promotes 
selfishness and reduces the private provision of public goods.  
  11Nevertheless, the most interesting point is that, from our data, the introduction of a winner-take-all 
market makes cooperation more attractive. A winner-take-all market leads subjects to start with 
high levels of contribution and sustains cooperation over time. This may be due to the fact that in a 
winner-takes-all scenario any investment in the private good becomes more risky. The consequence 
is that players may decide to cooperate even more than in absence of competition (BT). This seems 
to suggest that punishment is not the only instrument available to enhance cooperation in such a 
situation. 
 
Result 2. Group’s behavior influences members and contributions converge over time. 
Both in the BT  and in the CT,  if a subject’s contribution is higher (lower) than the average 
contribution of the group, he/she decreases (increases) his/her investment in the public good in the 
next round. This seems to support the idea that reciprocity is a relevant determinant of human 
behavior and that fair-minded players are conditional cooperators (see, for instance, Bardsley and 
Moffatt, 2005).  
A slightly different result emerges in the WTT where subjects reduce their contribution to the public 
good as the average contribution of the group is higher. This is in line with the idea that, the higher 
the contribution level of the other players to the public good, the higher the probability of being the 
winner in the competition to obtain the private good. 
 
Result 3. Subjects are sticky on their decisions. 
As we found out in our previous work (Canegallo et al., 2006), the way players behave at time t-1 
influences their decisions at time t. An increase/decrease in contribution to the public good at time t – 
1 increases/decreases contribution at time t.  
 
Result 4. Players tend to converge to the Nash equilibria in the last round. 
In Table 7, the minimum and the maximum contributions in the first and in the last rounds are 
reported for each group. In the last round this values are closer than in the first one both in the BT 
and in the CT. The opposite is true in the WTT. Moreover, in the BT 4 groups over 8 converge to 
the Nash equilibrium where all the players contribute nothing to the public good. In the CT this is 
the case for 6 groups over 8, while in the WTT this occurs only in one group. This may be due to 
the fact that in the WTT two possible strategies are optimal: contribute nothing or contribute 
everything. If we analyse the contribution of each player in groups from 17 to 24 (WTT) at round 
10, it turns out that, in fact, 19 players out of 32 decided to contribute nothing, 10 contribute 
  12everything and 3 invest at least 50 eurocents into the public good (Table 8). In the WTT treatment 
29 players choose a Nash equilibrium in the last period and 24 in the sixth one. 
 
 
  13Table 4 - Random-effects Tobit regression – Dependent variable: individual contribution to the 
public good 
 
  Specification 1  Specification 2   Specification 3 
 
Ci, t-1  1.59***   1.38***    1.44*** 
 (0.29)  (0.31)  (0.3)   
t  -3.15*   -8.06**    -7.07** 
  (1.89)  (3.27)    (3.31) 
CT -45.74***  -46.91*    -46.6* 
  (13.9)  (25.97)    (26.27) 
WTT  24.67**  -32.85    -9.09   
  (12.09)  (23.71)    (25.73) 
CT*t   0.16    -0.16 
    (4.7)    (4.77) 
WTT*t   11.67***            11.38*** 
   (4.32)    (4.37) 
∆negi, t-1  -1.65***  -1.48***   -1.31*** 
  (0.42)  (0.42)    (0.46) 
∆posi, t-1  1.01***  0.81**    1.43*** 
  (0.34)  (0.34)    (0.46) 
∆neg*WTT           -0.46 
         (0.33) 
∆pos*WTT         -1.48** 
         ( 0 . 6 9 )  
Constant  -35.01**  -4.58    -18.84 
  (15.15)  (21.26)    (21.21) 
 
Log likelihood  -1954.6346  -1953.2887    -1944.7666 
 
Wald χ
2  83.5*** 77.51***    87.33*** 
 
CT  = WTT  29.79*** 
σe  111.33***  107.63***           109.39*** 
  (6.65)  (8.46)    (6.86) 
σu  13.62***  18.61*              14.82*** 
  (3.5)  (10.6)    (4.81) 
 
Number of observations  832  832      832 
Number of uncensored    249     249      249 
Number lower censored    470     470      470 
Number upper censored  113  113      113 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*     significance at 10% 
**   significance at 5% 
*** significance at 1% 
 
  14Table 5 - OLS regression (cluster option) – Dependent variable: individual contribution to the 
public good 
 
  Specification 1  Specification 2  Specification 3 
 
Ci, t-1  0.61***   0.55***    0.55*** 
  (0.12)  (0.12)    (0.12) 
t  -0.24   -2.42***    -2.24*** 
  (0.56)  (0.73)    (0.76) 
CT  3.67  -4.46    -4.55 
  (4.72)  (7.1)    (7.2) 
WTT  21.63***  0.21    5.08 
  (4.45)  (7.54)    (8.26) 
CT*t   1.54    1.55 
    (0.94)    (0.94) 
WTT*t   4.34***  4.36*** 
   (1.32)    (1.33) 
∆negi, t-1  -0.65***  -0.59***   -0.54*** 
  (0.15)  (0.16)    (0.17) 
∆posi, t-1  0.24*  0.18    0.32* 
  (0.14)  (0.14)    (0.19) 
∆neg*WTT         -0.11 
         (0.13) 
∆pos*WTT         -0.35 
         ( 0 . 2 7 )  
Constant  10.97*  25.21    22.71*** 
  (5.64)  (7.49)    (7.9)   
 
F
  16.57*** 20.77***    17.18*** 
 
CT  = WTT  10.52*** 
 
 
Number of observations  832  832      832 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*     significance at 10% 
**   significance at 5% 
*** significance at 1% 
 
  15Table 6 - Tobit regression – Dependent variable: individual contribution to the public good 
 
  Specification 1  Specification 2  Specification 3 
 
Ci, t-1  1.66***   1.53***    1.54*** 
  (0.29)  (0.29)    (0.29) 
t  -3.09   -7.63**    -6.78** 
  (1.94)  (3.4)    (3.4) 
CT -45.37***  -46.69*    -47.14* 
  (13.66)  (26.8)    (26.81) 
WTT  23.82**  -29.55    -7.69 
  (11.98)  (24.52)    (26.29) 
CT*t   -0.21    -.037 
    (4.91)    (4.92) 
WTT*t   11.22**  11.06** 
   (4.51)    (4.5) 
∆negi, t-1  -1.65***  -1.54***   -1.35*** 
  (0.43)  (0.43)    (0.47) 
∆posi, t-1  1.02***  0.83**    1.5*** 
(0.35)  (0.35)    (0.46) 
∆neg*WTT         -0.44 
         (0.34) 
∆pos*WTT         -1.57** 
         (0.7) 
Constant  -34.97**  -5.3    -17.29 
  (16.52)  (23.6)    (24.18) 
 
Log likelihood  -1912.1615  -1907.9623    -1905.2799 
 
LR χ
2  122.78*** 131.17***    136.54*** 
 
CT  = WTT  31.03*** 
 
Number of observations  832  832      832 
Number of uncensored    249     249      249   
Number lower censored    470     470      470 
Number upper censored  113  113      113 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*     significance at 10% 
**   significance at 5% 
*** significance at 1% 
 
  16Table 7 
  First round  Last round 
Group  Min Max Min Max 
1*  25 100 10  50 
2  5 100 0  0 
3  25 100  0  35 
4  45 125  0  0 
5  25 75  0  1 
6  45 125  0  0 
7  0 100 0  30 
8*  0 25 0  0 
9  0 125 0  0 
10  0 125 0  0 
11  0 125 0  0 
12  0 75 0  0 
13  0 65 0  0 
14  1 125 0 125 
15  0 100 0  0 
16  0 0 0  125 
17  0 125 0 125 
18  0 123 0  50 
19  0 125 0  0 
20  12  125 0 125 
21  65  125 0 125 
22  0 75 0  125 
23  0 100 0 125 
24  25  125 0 125 
*For these groups, the last period is round 6. 
 
  17Table 8 
  First round  Last round 
  Group 17 
Player 1  125 125 
Player 2  0 0 
Player 3  0 0 
Player 4  5 125 
 Group  18 
Player 1  0 0 
Player 2  0 0 
Player 3  25 0 
Player 4  123 50 
 Group  19 
Player 1  125 0 
Player 2  0 0 
Player 3  25 0 
Player 4  49 0 
 Group  20 
Player 1  50 0 
Player 2  12 125 
Player 3  125 0 
Player 4  24 0 
 Group  21 
Player 1  65 125 
Player 2  120 0 
Player 3  75 65 
Player 4  125 125 
 Group  22 
Player 1  25 0 
Player 2  75 115 
Player 3  0 0 
Player 4  0 125 
 Group  23 
Player 1  0 0 
Player 2  0 0 
Player 3  100 125 
Player 4  100 125 
 Group  24 
Player 1  50 125 
Player 2  125 125 
Player 3  25 0 
Player 4  5 0 
 
 
  185. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to test if it is true that the level of cooperation is minimum under the 
hypothesis of perfect competition. The theoretical assumption was that both in the BT and in the CT, 
the Nash equilibrium was the absence of cooperation, while in the WTT this depends on the risk-
aversion level as well as on players believes. However, from previous works, it was clear that: 1) in 
the BT some players tend to cooperate during the first periods and then reduce their contributions 
over time; 2) perfect competition crowds-out cooperation. At the same time, we do not have any 
evidence concerning the effect of the a winner-take-all market competition on cooperation. 
The main results are the following: 1) at the beginning, contributions are significantly lower in 
the CT, but over time contributions in the BT and in the CT show a similar decreasing pattern while 
they are  significantly higher in the WTT; 2) in all the treatments in the last rounds, players tend to 




Instructions for Baseline Treatment 
1
5. Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating. There are neither difficulties nor 
tricky questions. You are only required to follow the instructions that will appear on your screen. 
Your answers will be absolutely anonymous. It will not be possible to the experimenter to match the 
answers with the person who provided them.  
Your answers will be absolutely anonymous. It will not be possible for the experimenters to match 
the answers with the person that provided them. During the experiment you will know other 




2. The experiment is made up by 10 periods. 
At the beginning of the first period, groups of 4 participants will be randomly created. The subjects 
in each group will be the same over the 10 periods. 
In each period, each participant will be endowed with 125 eurocents. This sum must be allocated 
between two different projects (A and B), according to your free choice. In other words you may 
                                                 
4 This is a translation; actual instructions were in Italian. We omit the after-the-job screens and the 
interactive screens. 
5 Numbers refer to screen displays. 
6 Participants were sitting in separate box-places, not allowing involuntary communication. 
  19choose to allocate from 0 to 125 eurocents in each of the two projects, for a total of 125 eurocents. 
You are asked to use all your 125 eurocents in each period.  
 
3. Since the sum earned in each period affects your final payment, we advise you to think carefully 
about decisions you will take in each period.  
The overall sum due to each participant will be calculated as the sum of what will be obtained from 
the two projects in each period. 
 
4.  Here is the description of the two projects: 
 
PROJECT A  
Each participant obtains the sum invested in this project, increased by 20%. 
 
PROJECT B 
In each group, the overall sum allocated in this project by all participants will be increased by 80% 
to form the fund that will be divided in equal shares among all participants of the group, whether 
they contributed to this project or not, and independently of how much each of them had contributed. 
 
5. We are now distributing on paper the same instructions you have just read on your computer. You 
have a few minutes to go through them. We advise you to consult them during the experiment, 
whenever you feel you need to
7. 
 
6. Before the experiment can begin, you will be asked some control questions, to check whether you 
have understood the rules. As soon as you finish, raise your hand. The assistants will check your 
answers and, in case of mistakes, they will help you to answer in the correct way. The experiment 
will begin as soon as every participant has successfully answered all control questions. 
 
7. Thanks to the control questions, rules should be clear. 
At the end of the tenth period, the experiment will end, and you will be asked to go to the next room 
to receive your payment. Participants will be called one at a time, through the number of the 
computer; therefore no one will know the results achieved by the other participants, nor other 
participants’ names. 
                                                 
7 At this point the assistants distribute the instructions on paper.  
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Instructions for the Competition Treatment  
The instructions are the same as for the Baseline Treatment, except for project A, which reads 
 
PROJECT A 
In each group, the overall sum allocated in this project by all participants will be increased by 20%, 
and the amount thus obtained will be entirely assigned to the participant who has allocated the 
highest sum in this project. All other participants will lose all the money they allocated in this 
project. If more than one participant in the group allocates the highest sum, the sum increased by 
20% will be equally divided among them. 
 
Instructions for the Winner-Take-All Treatment  
The instructions are the same as for the Baseline Treatment, except for project A, which reads 
 
PROJECT A 
In each group, the overall sum allocated in this project by all participants will be increased by 20%, 
and the amount thus obtained will be entirely assigned to the participant who has allocated the 
highest sum in this project. All other participants will lose all the money they allocated in this 
project. If more than one participant in the group allocates the highest sum, the sum increased by 
20% will be randomly assigned to one of them. 
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